Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 JUN 1984

STAT

Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences
University of West Florida
Pensacola, FL 32504

Dear STAT

Thank you for your recent letter expressing concern about the shortage in our country of persons trained in Soviet studies. It is a concern that is shared in both government and academe although I believe the article in The Listener, to which you refer in your letter, is overdrawn. I think that leading Soviet scholars such as Marshall Shulman at Columbia, Alexander Dallin at Stanford, Richard Pipés at Harvard, Myron Rush at Cornell, and others would contest the claim that their programs produced only five doctoral-level graduates in Soviet studies in 1982.

Moreover, the article ignores altogether the fact that the National Security Council represents the pinnacle of what is a very large and able aggregation of Soviet specialists within the Federal government as a whole. We are short, yes, but not decimated by any means and I think the quality of our knowledge and analysis of the Soviet world is, by and large, excellent. Recently, we have been successful in attracting or developing from within new numbers of people trained in Soviet affairs, although more are still needed, it is true.

Qualitatively, the country has extensive resources to call upon with regard to the Soviet world; perhaps the most important challenge is for academicians and governmental practitioners to work together in a way which brings the full force of these resources to bear on the issues posed by Soviet power and actions.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

P-304

SUBJECT: Letter to [redacted] STAT

Distribution:
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CAA/PAO [redacted] (8 June 84) STAT

THE LISTENER

[illegible] W1
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9 JUNE 1983 [illegible]

Anthony Cl[illegible] John Cole the BBC's Politic[illegible] reporter Nicholas Witchell [illegible] Mrs Thatcher and the [illegible] Elsewhere in the issue is a [illegible] Clancy Sigal mauls Norman M[illegible] mammoth new novel, suicidally [illegible] Frank Delaney writ[illegible] with Mailer in New York, [illegible] him immensely likeable, esp[illegible] when he knows he is going over [illegible] on wry'. Delaney himself catches the liverish eye of our itinerant Irish television critic John Naughton for being too respectful to Mailer in their TV encounter. And Henry Kelly, last week's Langham Diarist, is another Irishman who annoys Naughton for being ...well, too nice to everybody. We shall see. **R.T.**

FEATURES

S[illegible] BOOKS

RADIO AND TV REVIEWS

VIEWER/LISTENER GUIDE

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Stuart Simon: America's Kremlinology crisis

'We don't even know who Andropov's wife is!'

The curr[illegible]nt expert in Soviet affairs on America's Na[illegible]ional Secu[illegible]y Council is just 32 years old—and has never been to [illegible] Soviet Union. Last year the United States spent $250 [illegible]ion on defence—and produced just five PhDs in Soviet studies. In short, even allowing for the expertise of 91-year-old Averell Harriman, the Americans are suffering a dearth of Kremlinologists, as Stuart Simon, reporting for Radio 4's *File on 4*, discovered.

The newly arrived Western correspondent in Moscow had heard a rumour: a Warsaw Pact summit was planned. But when, where—and why? He did what seemed the logical thing, and phoned the information department of the Central Committee. 'Why are you calling us?' asked a suspicious voice. 'Because you are the information department.' 'Yes,' said the voice after what sounded a genuinely puzzled pause, 'but we don't *give* information —we *get* it.'

It's just over 25 years since the United States was shocked into the realisation of what a policy of determined and purposeful reticence can achieve. All Sputnik 1—the world's first orbiting satellite—could do was bleep. It was enough, though, to convey with exasperating repetitiveness the message th[illegible] America had failed: failed to understa[illegible] that it didn't have the long technologica[illegible] lead it imagined, and failed to assess either the capacities or the intentions of its ideological rival. Frantic and accident-prone attempts to correct the first failure were soon all over the headlines and television screens. The second received equally urgent, but less publicised, attention. The Defence Education Act was rushed through Congress, providing government funds to beef up Soviet studies in the country's major universities. Never again would the world's greatest nation be so embarrassingly caught on the hop.

That was the theory. The practice looks different. Last year, the United States spent $250 billion on defence—and produced just five PhDs in Soviet studies. The old habits have returned, and America has a full-scale Kremlinology crisis.

To Foreign Service professionals like Dick Combs of the State Department's Soviet desk, the problem is far from academic in nature. On his own personal desk sits a model of Sputnik, rescued from a New York junk shop. 'It's a timely reminder of the problem,' says Mr Combs. 'I think it's unlikely we'll have another shock like that. Our intelligence-gathering is a lot better than it was in 1957. What we do lack now is the people to analyse the raw data: to make accurate assessments of the mood of the Soviets and to predict their behaviour and formulate policy. The universities just aren't turning out the specialists that they once were. Educational expenses have been going through the roof, there have been cutbacks across the board, and unfortunately Russian language and Soviet studies have been among the first victims.'

This diagnosis is supported by General George Keegan, Head of Air Force intelligence in the Sevent[illegible]s. 'We have an absolute dearth of the kind of experts we had in the 1950s,' says General Keegan. 'People who knew about Soviet history, ideology and doctrine: people who understood the functions of the bureaucracy and the Soviet Communist Party. It's a very dangerous situation, because I regard a deep knowledge of such matters as the absolute key to concluding proper treaties and conducting vital negotiations such as those on arms control.' Ironically, General

egan believes, it's the very cause of the ...inal American knee-jerk in 1957—the ... it—that's helped create his country's ... predicament. 'I remember the shock that greeted the first ... satellites,' he says. 'The intelli... community went through a period of ... that they would tell us everything ... needed to know about the Russians' ...abilities: how many missiles they had, ...ere they were and so on. It led to a ...placement of analysts by people whose ...nction was pure bean-counting.' Detente ...d a waning of the perceived threat from ...e Soviet Union have also played their ...art. The effects, the General believes, have ...een disastrous. 'When we were negotiating the Helsinki accords we had no one ...ho could tell our senior negotiator or ...ained the President of the United States ...st what it was Brezhnev was saying in his ...nal speech. It was days before we knew. ...nd it's the same today in the talks going ...n in Geneva. Very often, we don't know ...or a month what a certain Soviet nuance ...eans and therefore exactly what it is ...at's expected of us.'

Many would agree with General Keegan ...t it's not just analysis, but its pre-...quisite—language proficiency—that is ...uffering a startling decline. Paul Simon, a ...emocratic Representative from Illinois, is ...e of them. 'In the last five years, over ... colleges and universities I know of have ...opped the teaching of Russian in the ...ited States. I was in Minnesota the other ...y, and I was told that 20 years ago ...ere were 48 high schools teaching Rus...n. Now there are three. What's more, ...e now spend more on a quarter of a mile ...terstate highway than on the whole of ...ur cultural and scientific exchange pro...amme with the Warsaw Pact countries.' ...o try to remedy the situation, Paul Simon ...s sponsoring one of a pair of bills cur...ntly before Congress aimed at providing ...250 million infusion of funds to increase ...he flow of factual information on the East...rn bloc. Part of the problem, he believes, ...s a deep-seated complacency and paro...hialism that runs through much of Am...rican thinking. 'It's this kind of provin...ialism that causes us to elect narrow-...inded legislators,' he argues. 'There's not ...single member of the House or Senate ...ho can really be called an expert on the ...oviet Union. We don't even use the ex...erts we *do* have properly. Look at Foreign ...inister Gromyko, who's been through 22 ...ifferent American Secretaries of State, or ...mbassador Dobrynin, who's been in Wash...ton for 20 years. Yet we take men like ...verell Harriman or George Kennan, use ...em for a couple of years, and put them ...the shelf.'

...verell Harriman, who, strangely enough, ...d informal talks with Mr Andropov last ...ek, has a longer acquaintance with East-...st relations than any living person on ...ther side. His own Soviet studies began ...th a meeting with Trotsky in 1926 and ...d him to the post of ambassador to Mos...w in the mid-Forties. At 91, he's been ... for nearly half the history of the ...ited States as an independent nation. ...oday, he's worried. 'Policy based on ig-



Soviet staying-power: Ambassador Dobrynin (l.), 20 years in Washington; and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'veteran' of 22 American Secretaries of State

norance and illusion is dangerous,' he warns. 'Our knowledge of the Soviet Union has always been poor, but it's at a lower ebb than ever today, and something has to be done.' 'Something', in this case, is the donation of $10 million from his personal fortune to New York's Columbia University, whose Russian Research Centre, together with Harvard, forms the spearhead of American Kremlin-watching effort. To Jonathan Sanders, Deputy Director of what's now been renamed the Harriman Institute at Columbia, the cash may mean a chance to tap sources of knowledge that have so far been out of reach. 'There's a tremendous amount of information there to be had,' he points out. 'The Soviets publish reams and reams of material. Our trouble is that although we're one of the two largest institutions of our kind, we simply don't have the staff to keep up with it.' Of course, Jonathan Sanders concedes, there are occasions when the sheer secrecy of a closed society like the Soviet one succeeds in shutting out factual scrutiny, as well as more general insight. 'At some levels, our ignorance is extraordinary,' he admits. 'We don't even know, for example, who Andropov's wife is!'

Those words: 'I don't know', are not ones that come easily to a Kremlinologist. Many of them talk of the immense pressures on them to come up with an assessment—*any* assessment—when they're asked for one. Perhaps because of this, and the sheer frustration of trying to bridge the information gap, they also tend to blind themselves with their own science on occasion. Too often, what Jonathan Sanders calls 'the tealeaf-reading approach' is used to interpret the significance, for example, of who stands where at the May Day Parade. 'If some prominent figure is missing, everyone starts reading this back and concluding that there's been some hidden power struggle in which he's been ousted. But suppose we knew, as I happen to from talking to his granddaughter, that one of the Soviet leaders has a bladder problem and that when he has attacks of it he has to urinate frequently. He's not going to show up on the Lenin Mausoleum on one of those days, because he'd have to stand there for several hours. I'm not saying there might not be a power struggle *as well*, but there is a danger of giving ourselves a false picture.'

Whatever *did* go on when Brezhnev died, it's now clear that by the manner, if not by the fact, of his rise to power, Yuri Andropov has been the Sputnik of the Eighties. There's an acute awareness that the Kremlinologists in America were still arguing about the short list when his name emerged. 'Everyone here thought there would be a lot of jockeying around at first, with no one person really able to call the tune,' says Roger Molander, formerly on the staff of the National Security Council in the White House. 'By contrast, Andropov not only grabbed the honours but hit the ground running. People here were left saying: "Hey, wait a minute! There's supposed to be a transition period here! We're not supposed to be put in the position of having to react to someone who's being aggressive and coming up with all these new initiatives and proposals over arms control and so on."'

No one would deny that any administration in Washington has a problem, not just with the information barrier erected by the Russians, but with the conflicting advice that results from the attempts of

different government departments and agencies to br[illegible]. Does the State Department say that the Soviet economy is in trouble and that the time is therefore ripe to push for change in the political system? Not [illegible] says the CIA. The Soviet GNP is second only to that of the United States and is in good shape. Well, not exactly good shape, says a report to Congress published last week, but it's no good thinking you can make the Russians change their ways by threatening economic warfare. And so on. The assessments tend to reflect the preoccupations of their authors, not least in the case of the National Security Council, whose members are appointed by the President. The current Soviet expert at the NSC, author of *Soviet Perceptions of US Foreign Policy*, is 32 years old and has never been to the Soviet Union. 'One does not need to be hit by a locomotive to know that it's dangerous,' he explains.

In the end, of course, it is the diplomats who have to pick up the pieces at the negotiating table when, for example, their President has just characterised the Soviet Union as 'the focus of evil in the world'. The preoccupation of men like Dick Combs at the State Department is to be able to form the sort of judgments about the Soviet Union that will make it possible to influence it in ways that serve long-term US interests. And he worries that America no longer has the power to do that. 'We're at a point now where, even if we take action immediately, we can't recoup the loss of qualified Soviet experts we've suffered. If we don't, I think we're heading for a major crisis.'

A major crisis between the superpowers is precisely what was predicted only last month by George Kennan, former ambassador to Moscow and one of America's most highly respected experts on the Soviet Union. Speaking to an invited audience in Washington which included the Soviet ambassador, Dobrynin, Kennan addressed himself to what he called 'the wider, non-military aspects of Soviet-American relations', which, he said, had 'deteriorated over the years to a dreadful and dangerous condition'. Civility of communication, he said, had broken down and the statements and actions of both sides had become permeated with antagonism, suspicion and cynicism. 'In this country at least,' George Kennan declared, 'discussion of the relationship has become almost totally militarised. Can anyone doubt the ominous meaning of such a state of affairs? These phenomena, when they occur between highly armed great powers, are the familiar characteristics of a march towards war—that and nothing else.'

The meaning becomes even more ominous if you accept the judgment of General George Keegan, the former intelligence chief. 'If the information that we were about to be attacked were handed to us on a silver platter from 150 satellites,' he warns, 'we would still fail to understand, because we still fail to be realistic and we still refuse to keep enough experts around who are adequately trained to give us the right advice quickly. I am very nervous about the years ahead.'

John Cole: Was St Francis only delayed?

Few signs of a mellow m with so many new com



This is a dual-purpose article. It may be read either as a portrait of our Prime Minister at the beginning of her second term or as a political obituary of Margaret Thatcher, Britain's first woman Prime Minister—depending on when you receive THE LISTENER, and what the result is.

At the time of writing, the first seems altogether more probable. But experience counsels caution. The wall of our cloakroom at home still awaits a yellowing *Guardian* galley-proof, which I will one day have framed (for your columnist, though reliable about copy-times, is less assiduous about household chores). In it, I offered editorial advice to Harold Wilson on how to reconstruct his Cabinet after his expected election victory of 1[illegible]. The real results came in time for the *Guardian* to give similar, if more hurried, advice to Edward Heath, the unexpected winner.

Whatever the result, Mrs Thatcher has had a good election. The opinion polls indicate that she is a considerable asset to her party. Her performance on television, at press conferences and on public platforms has been, within the guidelines she or her genes have set for her, formidable: sure-footed, assured, dispassioned, convinced even to those who do not find her convincing.

An academic who knew both Margaret Thatcher and Shirley Williams when they were young is reported to have said that 'one was all head and the other all heart—but not the way you would think'. Like all paradoxes, and most smart Oxford chatter, it contains only part of the truth: Mrs Williams has considerable heart, Mrs Thatcher a strong if not a strongly speculative intellect.

Where it does illuminate the truth is in emphasising that Mrs Thatcher has emotions also. This has been showing during the campaign. Last week there were times, particularly when journalists cross-questioned her about the sinking of the *Belgrano*, when she seemed near to breaking-point. Her eyes might flash with anger as she spoke, yet in quieter moments she looked hurt. She played uncharacteristically with an earring. The perfect composure slipped just a little.

The assumption that Mrs Thatcher is 'all head' doubtless arose from her dual qualifications as industrial chemist and tax lawyer. She has also fitted in Parliament, Cabinet and Opposition front-bench while bringing up a family, which certainly indicates commitment and single-mindedness.

Yet Mrs Thatcher, in fact, i[illegible] from Aneurin Bevan's famou[illegible] 'a desiccated calculating ma[illegible] said appropriate to Hugh Gai[illegible] to Harold Wilson. There wa[illegible] error in the *Sunday Times* wh[illegible] 'the Prim Minister'. Such err[illegible] ally have a m[illegible]ic truthfulnes[illegible] this time t[illegible] slipped fing[illegible] Thatcher wrong. To watch [illegible] aides when she cuts loose in [illegible] or interview does not mak[illegible] primness is what they fear.

Whether head or heart do[illegible] Prime Minister's outstanding[illegible] self-discipline. She uses her f[illegible] launching-pad for her politics[illegible] a revealing moment in her int[illegible] Brian Walden. As his precio[illegible] ticked away, she was giving [illegible] answer. He tried to get another[illegible]

'Don't interrupt me, I'm i[illegible] the Prime Minister shouted, [illegible] self-satire. It is when she is in[illegible] that some of Mrs Thatcher's m[illegible] able remar[illegible]re made. She d[illegible] bit, but wh[illegible] emotion takes ov[illegible] automatic pilot, she is most int[illegible] the interviewer insists too m[illegible] right to guide the dis[illegible]ussion, he [illegible] led back into the [illegible] statisti[illegible] in which she also d[illegible]ights to [illegible] this occasion, Walde[illegible] left her in[illegible] but was rewarded, al[illegible]s, only wit[illegible] gent, remorseless Thatcher, fitt[illegible] six or seven points she felt she [illegible] made clearly enough.

It is this aggressive self-assu[illegible] attracts some people and rep[illegible] Sydney Smith once said of a fa[illegible] bridge head of college that 'il[illegible] was science, his foible was om[illegible] There is a touch of that a[illegible] Thatcher: she is 'armed so [illegible] honesty' and glories in being 'c[illegible] the Northern Star'. Yet this is n[illegible] a streak of caution, a concealed [illegible] ness that, for example, has left[illegible] manifesto much less definite abou[illegible] like rates, education vouchers a[illegible] spending in the social services [illegible] might instinctively like.

The other strong plus and mi[illegible] the Prime Minister are her social [illegible] A leading figure in the SDP said [illegible] 'It's not her Victorian values so [illegible] her [illegible]urban values that I hate [illegible] fo[illegible]ctoral thesis there. You c[illegible] b[illegible]e sure w[illegible] people [illegible] su[illegible]n values. 'Tony Crosland [illegible] ye[illegible] before he had come to [illegible] Ha[illegible] Wilson's virtues, used to [illegible] cri[illegible] of his lifestyle.

'The bloody man p[illegible]s golf,' expostulated, when I said a few

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks

Please prepare reply for DCI's signature.

STAT

Executive Secretary

30 May 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

The University of West Florida

Pensacola, Florida 32504

College of Arts and Sciences
Department of History

STAT

Executive Registry
84-2132

May 24, 1984

Honorable William J. Casey, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, VA

Dear Sir:

I wonder whether you or the appropriate person in your Agency would kindly address my question. Lately, in certain quarters, it has been contended that our country has a shortage of persons trained in Soviet studies.(see, e.g., the article "We Don't Even Know Who Andropov's Wife Is," in the June 9, 1983 issue of The Listener). It's said that in 1982 the United States produced only five Ph.D.'s in Soviet studies. Does the Agency share this assessment of shortage?

Our department has a practical interest in this question. If it is true that there is a need for more trainees in this vital area, perhaps we could mount such a program here. We are therefore keenly concerned to know your view and would appreciate your assessment.

Sincerely,

STAT

STAT

See enclosed note.

DCI
EXEC
REG

P-304

THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA
PENSACOLA, FLORIDA 32504

STAT

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INSTITUTION.

STAT

May 24, 1984

Dear Mr. Casey,

As I write, the so-called "Briefing-gate" matter has once more appeared in the news. As a Democrat, let me assure you that no one in this country gives a hoot about the matter, except Democratic strategists. We out here in the nation just wish it would go away. We understand politics and ask each other, "How come they can't find out who gave away the Carter material, only who received it?"

I sincerely hope this ordeal does not affect your administration of the C.I.A., a much more important matter than uncovering who pulled off a minor campaign coup in 1980.

Sincerely,

STAT